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1. Introduction. 
This paper is about a topic in the semantics of interrogatives. In what 
follows a numbn of assumptions figure at the background which, though 
intuitively appcaling, have not gom' undrnlleuge<l, and it seems therefore 
only fair to draw the reader's attention to them at the outset. 
The first assnmptiou CO!H"tTns a n:ry global intuition abont the kin<l 
of semantic objects that we associate with interrogatives. The intuition 
is that there is an intimate relationship between intPrrogatives and their 
answers: an interrogative determines what counts as an answer.** Given 
a certain, indepcnclently motivated, view on what constitutes the meaning 
of an answer, this intuition, in return, determines what constitutes the 
meaning of an intPrrogative. For example, starting from the observation 
that answcrs are true or false in sitnations, we may be !eel to the view that 
answers express propositions, i.e., objects which determine a truth valne in a 
situation. Given that nmch, our hasic intnitiou says that interrogatives are 
to be associated with ol,jects which determine propositions. Such objects 
will be rcferrcd to as 'questions· in what follows. Notice that all this is 
largely frnmcwork irnlepenclent: ,,·e have made no assumptions yet about 
what sitnations, propositions, and CJlH'stions are, we have only related them 
in a certain systematic way. In fact W<' will use a more or less standard, 
but certainly not 1111controversial, specification in what follows: situations 
are identified with (total) possible worlds; propositions with sets of worlds; 
and <p1estions with cq11ivalc11c<' rdatious on the set of worlds. 
The second ass111nptio11 that plays a role iu what follows is of a more 
linguistic n;1t11re. Iuterrogatin's typically occur in two ways: as indepen-
dent expressious, all(l as c0111pk11w11ts of certain verbs. The assnmption 
rs that these two ways of occ111Ti11g are systematically related, uot jnst 
* The prqrnrntion of thi.s paper was supported by ti!(' Esprit Dasie Re-
search Action DYAN A. \Ve wonld like to thank Craige Roberts for her helpful 
cmnments. 
** This i11t11ition is what Ddnap (in Ddnap 1981) calls tlw 'answcrhoocl 
thesis'. 
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syntactically hut also semantically.• Notice that the exact nature of this 
relationship is un<lf'r<lf'terminPd by this assumption: the most strict spec-
ification would rcquin~ an interrogative to have the same nwaning when 
occurring independently and embedded, but weak,0 r spcdlirn.tions would 
also satisfy this requireme11t. The strict view combined with the previous 
assumption entails that both embedded and imkpende11t interrogatives ex-
press questions, and that verbs embedding iutnrogative,; express relations 
to questions. Such relations may be of various kinds: a vnb may express a 
n'lation to the question as such, in which case WP call it 'int<'nsi01rnl', or it 
may express a relation to the proposition which is thC' value of th<' qm'stion 
iu the actual world. in which case it is labelled 'extC'nsional'. 
The third ass11mptio11 that plays a role i11 what follows is of a mon' 
methodologirn.l nat11r('. It conc<'rns the way in which a sprnantic analysis 
deals with the g<·ucrnl, 'noss-cat<'g;orial' phc·m>1n,·nn. of coordina.tio11 and 
e11tailme11t. Roughly the assumption is that coordination and 1.•ntailment 
are <Toss-categorial not only in a syntactic sense, but also semantically: a 
s<'mantics of niordiuat.iou and n1taihn<'ut which is gt'!l<'rnl i11 th<' snisc of 
!wing specified ind<'JWntkntly of the category/type of ,·xpr('ssion, involn'd 
is to lw preferred to 011<' whid1 is defined for each category/type of ex-
pressions s<'paratdy. Again, this assumption is to a extent. fnurn'work 
indqiendent. \Vithin the· dassirn.l iuteHsional typethPorPtic framework that 
,w will <'mploy i11 what follows w<· will assume that rnnrdinat.ion is d(,fined 
point-wis<' l,y the st.amlanl Lookan cornwdives. awl that PJl1 ailment is de-
fined as rneaninp; inclusion.•• 
It is interestill/', to notP that if we comlii11e this third nssumpt.ion with 
th<· kind of aualysis tliat <'lllngt·s fnnn what we said abov,-, (TrUun prl'dic-
tions result nmn'rning entailmPnt relations lwtwPPll interrogatives. Given 
our first Hssumption th,· 111<•ani11g nf an interrogative is an nbject which 
det<'nnines in a situ.ti ion what counts as an ,mswt'r. Giveu that entailment 
is m<'anin.e; iudw;imL an intr-rrnp,tive I entails another intPrro.e;ati,-c I' iff 
,•\'ery answer to Ii,; iill :111swcT tn J1 Thi, s<'cms to h<· a11 illtnitin.Jy ac· 
cq,tahle rcs11lt: :i.skinµ, ii <1111·stim1 involv<'s askiu.e; ;tl!otl1('r 011,· if th<· latter 
i,: answered if th<' fonn,'r is. 
Tl,is gives a rongl1 sketdt uf tit<' coutours oft h(' spac,• witl1in whirl! a n·aso11· 
ab!<- semantics for iut<·rroµ;at.iv<·s is 1.o IH' found, hut i11 ord<'r tu apprt'ciatc 
• Bdnap (op. cit..) mils thi,, the 'iwlqwndnt1. JLt(',llliui!; 1ll('si,,'. Jt can lw 
vicw('d as a SJ)<'!'ial inst:rnc<' of th,• principl<- of compositiomility, giw·n acer-
t;iiu rnthcr irnturnl ,·icw oll th<' syntactic ;,tat.us of ,•ml1<·,hkd iutcrrogativcs. 
•• Tlw ,·mpirical prol.,l.,·rn•; with t liis daim. for ,·xa111.pl.,· 1l1<N' c1,11e<T11inp., 
non .. booll',lll c<" ,rdini!tiou ,md fre,' dH,ic<' J.HTmissi<>11, are u, ,t reln·;mt for 
t Jw isc-m's disc11ss<'d i11 I !tj., p;qwr 
l(JJ 
th(' problems that we are i11ten'St<'d in, we have to be a little more spe-
citic about what w,_, take the hasic S('1uantics of iutcrro11;atives to ],.,. As 
W<' iw!ir.ated abon•. we ass11me that au intrrrogativ<' ,·xpres,-es an equiva-
lence rdatior, Lcrw,·,·11 worlds. \\'hat is this <''fni,-alcw·,, rdatio11'I Ho11ghly 
speaking it. is the relation of being extcusionally the ,,mnc with respecr to 
some relation. Connetcly, an interrogative is based 01: a rdational expres-
sion: it expresses an inquiry about the extension of a relation. A sentential 
intern,gative can lw ,·i1•wcd as has('d 011 a zero-pin<'" relation, i.e., a scn-
t,•nrr, and thus ,•xpresses an inquiry ahc,nt a truth value. The worlds which 
ill'(' i1u!ist.i11,g11isl1al,l,•.with n·sp,Yt to th<' 1·Xkllsion of a ct>rtain relation to-
getht'r mab• up a 1,rnpositiou. whi\'h c:rn b(' ide11tifi<'d with !ht> prupositio11 
cxpr('SS('<l hy an answn to the rorre;;pnnding intnroga ti\'('. S11d1 a proposi-
tion ,::ives an c•xhausti,-,, sp<'cification of: h'-' positiv(' ('Xtc-11sion of the rdatiuu 
inn,h-cd. :\'otic<' that it follm,·s that iu each world tllt' <jlt('stion exprcs,cd 
by ,Ill iuterrog,tti\'<' det.crmirws ,·xnctly one propositi,,n: the co1uplt't<" true 
ausw,-r to the int<·rrogat.i\'('. Iu s<"ctiou :2 we will 0111 liu(' how this ,·i('w can 
he impl,·m,·11ted, 1101,· W(· 1t1r11 t<J s"1111· ol,s,.n·;itions tlu,t s,·,·111 to l><· at odcls 
witl1 tlw, m1,dysis. 
ill his diss<'rtat:011 Stephen Bcrnw11· has argu('d that wh-tcnns lik,, 
whu /; Bt-ndent(s) i11 uauy ways hehan· lik<' indefinite terms snch as a ,t Ii· 
,ln1./j.5tudent.,. I3nman's I11aiu HIJ\llllli'llt conr(•n1s thl'ir behavior under 
adn·rlis of qw1nt1fi,·;1tio11, as in rll<' following C'Xillltple: 
(lJ 	Tlw pri11<·ip,,l u,11all~- fi11d, <•lit which st11d,·111s clwat 011 the• filial 
('XllllL 
A,c,,rding to I3<'nlfri:. this sf'llt<'n,e Im,, t,w> readings. lle,-ides the rf'adiug 
paraphrased in (2 ). t lwr,' is also a rnuiiug that ran be par:iphrased as in ( 3 ): 
(:2) 	 In most (liaal exam) sitn;,tioas the principal fiuds oui which stndeHts 
r-lwat in that sitnatinu. 
l 3 i 	Of most stwlcuts \\ ho ('hrnt 011 t lw fiual <'Xillll th(· pri11cipal find., 
"ut that they cb·;,1 Oil th<' final ,,x;,111. 
Ikrrnan com·incin1sly ,,rgn<'s that th<'s,· two reading,, of ( 1) are diffHc!!t. 
Suppose that ill ead1 of the (fi11,,l cx;,n1) sitnntic,us tlw principal catches 
75 percent of t lw ch('aters, tl1,·1, on paraphrase (:) ), scntPncc• (1) would be 
tru<'. lint "11 tll(' n·;idi111'-. p:11itphrnsl'd hy (:3). >il'!lkrn'(' (1) wunld lw fal,P. 
Foi I:!) to lH' tnw, it sl1onlcl l,,, the ms,· that fur rnosr of th<' (liual l'Xa111) 
sitn:,rions the princi:,"l ,·atdws ;ill clw:,tiaµ; studcnt~-
Thb is takcH t,, indicate that H •rl,-tnru like ·wh,,h .student doe:- ant 
contain a quantifin 1,~· ihdf. hnt µ;,_•ts its quantifin,ti()ual force from an 
• Dn·mau 1001 i S"" ;,l,;o lkrnrnn (1990).1. 
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adverb of quantification, much in the same way as this has been argued to 
be the case for indefinites as in ( 4 ): 
(4) 	If a student cheats on the final exam then the principal usually 
finds out that he does. 
Of course the adverb of quantification may be implicit, in which case it 
is supposed to have universal quantificational force. On this assumption 
Berman gets the interpretation paraphrased in (6) for a sentence like (5): 
(5) 	The principal found out which students cheated on the final exam. 
(6) 	For all students who cheated on the final exam the principal found 
out of them that they cheated on the final exam. 
This paraphrase of the meaning of (5) is not quite what one would ex-
pect assuming the kind of semantics outlined above. Recall that on that 
approach questions are strongly exhaustive in the following sense: a ques-
tion determines in a possible world a unique proposition, one which gives 
a complete specification of the positive extension in that world of the re-
lation involved. It is precisely this aspect of strong exhaustiveness that is 
lacking from the semantic interpretation that Berman assigns to the em-
bedded interrogative in (5). For it is clear that (6) is compatible with it 
being the case that the principal accuses a number of non-cheaters of hav-
ing cheated. But in the analysis outlined earlier the proposition which the 
question expressed by the embedded interrogative determines in the actual 
world, and to which the principal stands in the relation of having found 
out, is strongly exhaustive. Hence on that analysis the principal should not 
accuse non-cheaters, if ( 5) is to be true. 
Of course the same holds for sentence ( 1) and Berman's paraphrase (3). 
Clearly ( 1) entails ( 3 ), but it is not entailed by (3): if the principal indeed 
found out about most cheaters that they cheated, but also accused more 
than just a few non-cheaters of having cheated, then whereas ( 1) would be 
false according to the strong exhaustiveness approach, its proposed para-
phrase is not. 
Berman's paraphrases represent a different view on answers, and con-
sequently, on the meaning of interrogatives. According to this view the 
answer to an interrogative need only be weakly exhaustive. The difference 
with the strongly exhaustive approach is most easily explained in terms of 
question-answer pairs. Consider the following example: 
(7) 	Which girls are asleep? 
-Mary, Suzy and Jane (are asleep). 
According to the weakly exhaustive view, the answer rn (7) means sim-
ply that Mary, Suzy and Jane are girls that are asleep. According to the 
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strongly <'xhanstive view it lll('ans that lvlary, Sm:y and .lm1<' an~ the girls 
that are asl<'<'J). i.e., it say;, that only Mary, S11zy and .Jnne nr<' 11;irls that nr<' 
asleep. In other words, th<' two views differ with rPspect to \Vhat proposi 
tion counts as the trll(' ans\\'('f to thf' <Jllf'stion which µ;iris nre n.sln·p, and 
h<'ncT to whnt is the of the interrogatin·. 
Differcut view;,; oil wlrnt constituki:; the unccuuu._ of au interrogative 
h•ad to ,liffereut pn•dictiom; n·gardiug the logical propert ie;; of (embetkk<l) 
illterrngati\·es. Let us om' simple illustration. We saw above that 
isivt•n the standard of ent,,ilmeut as uwaning inclusion, and given 
tlw genen1l chan,etffizatio11 uf tlw meaning of i11 terms of 
their answl'rlmod con<litious, au interrogative I e11tails all interrogative I' 
iff wlwu<'V<'r a propositions p gh·<·s n tnH' ,m:-;11·,·r to I, j> a true answ,T 
to I' as well. If we comhi1w this with stroug <'xhm1:-,tiv<'IH'SS 11·e predict that, 
the int<'ITO).(iltiw' in ( i) ,·11t;,i], (S) (assumi11p; thilt we knrrw that Clain' is a 
_girl): 
Dut undn weak ('Xl1crnstivn1('ss this dues 11ot follow, If t\fnry. 
awl ,fone an· asl,·cp, tlw iuterrogati1·,, iu (T) ll'onld denote tlw propositiou 
that th<'y iii"<' asleep, h11t that d"<'S not <'lllail th;it CIHir, is nnt. asleep.0 
which in t.hm :,itrn,tiou would LH.' di(' tnH' m1s11·,·r to (S). Similnrly, strong 
cxliaustiv,'m·ss pn'did:, tL11 (GI: 
(D) John klloWs which 
rntails (HJ): 
( 10) John k1wws whi't.her Cl11ir,· is asleq,. 
Bnt Wt>;,k <'xh;rnsti1·1·1w:,:, 1nnk1·s (D) comp,,tihk witl1 John lwlin·i11g that 
Claire is asl<'q>. ill ms<' slw is not. arnl still kuo1\' which girls an' askqi. 
lu v:,rirn1s ]'];,.·,·:.' ,,.,. h:,1·,· ;,rgu<'d th;,I tlw :,t1,,11e,ly <"Xh,111stive inln 
prd,1tio11 of I 1•,e, 1:, tlw l,msi,· Oll<'. In , 111r, lpiui, >ll, pr('(!ict ionJS s11cl1 
as tll<' 01ws illu,-:11;!1,·d nlimT <"<>!lstit11te ,,rr,,11111, 11ls iu f;,1·<>11r of this posi 
tinll. Otlwr ;11µ:111111·1tb ,·m, J", ,.,l,l,,d. To iwlir·;ill' j11:,t Olli', s11p]hN' Hilary 
w,rnt s to find out, ll'!iid1 girl, ilJ'<' ;isle<'p. Slw asks Pd,·r, who rq)li<·s tlwt 
h<' doesn't know, lmt adds th;,t ,Jolu1 do<'s. Now s11ppos,•, as \l't' did ahoY<'. 
tl1;it John lH'Ji,,1·,,,, tli,11 l\lary, S11zy. Jaiw ;i]l(l Cb,ir,• are ;,;;l,·q), wh,·rcas i11 
fad only the fir.st till<'<' of tlwm nre. Asked l,,1· llib,ry wl1id1 r;irls ill'<' asl<'ep, 
.JolJII ;rnswn,, tl1,it \L,ry, S11:,_1·. .J;i1w ;md Clai1<' ;m•. Suppos(' f1uril1<'r th;it 
llil.1ry s11l,,:i·,p1nlll:· liu,b 1,111 tl1;,t Cb,in' is1,'t ;1:;], <']>. \\',ndd slw uot quit,· 
ri,e,l1tly cL1i1J1 tk,t rlw ;,w;11·n ,.Jw t;"t froJI1 .Join, l\',1, \\'lout;. tlwt iu f:,ct lw 
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did not know which girls were asleep, and that Peter was wrong in claiming 
that he did? 
Another difference between the weak and strong exhaustiveness views 
shows up when we consider other embedding verbs such as wonder. Derman 
observes that if we replace the verb find out in ( 1) by the verb wonder the 
result is a sentence which has one reading less: 
(11) 	The principal usually wonders which students cheat on the final 
exam. 
This sentence can only be paraphrased, Berman notes, as in ( 12): 
(12) 	In most (final exam) situations, the principal wonders which 
students cheat in that situation. 
but lacks a reading corresponding to paraphrase (3) of (1). 
Obviously, the source of the difference between ( 1) and ( 4) is a differ-
ence in lexical semantic properties of the verbs find out and wonder. What 
you find out if you find out which students cheat, is the true answer to the 
question which students cheat, i.e., you stand in the relation of finding out 
to the proposition that is the true answer to the question which students 
cheat. In case you wonder which students cheat, you do not stand in a 
relation to the proposition that expresses the true answer, rather you bear 
a particular relation to the question as such expressed by the interrogative, 
a relation which can be roughly paraphrased as that of wanting to find out 
the true answer to that question. In the terminology used above, we can say 
that the difference between verbs such as find out and verbs such as wonder 
is that whereas the latter are intensional the former are extensional. 
Within the confines of the particular a.pproach outlined above, this 
difference is accounted for by means of the usual distinction between the 
intension and the extension of an expression. The extension of an ( em-
bedded) interrogative is a proposition, its intension a (particular kind of) 
propositional concept. A verb ;,uch as find out takes the extension of an 
(embedded) interrogative as semantic argument, and a verb like wonder 
operates on its intension. 
One thing to note here, is that the distinction between extensional and 
intensional embedding verbs does not coincide with the distinction between 
£active and non-factive verbs. Verbs like know or find out are factive with 
respect to their indicative complements. Knowing or finding out that Mary 
is asleep entails (presupposes) that Mary is actually asleep. Verbs like tell 
or believe on the other hand, are not £active. Telling or believing that Mary 
is asleep does not entail (presuppose) that she actually is. Note however 
that, unlike believe, tel/can also take interrogatives as argument, as in John 
tells whether Mary is asleep. And in that case tell does behave in a £active 
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manner: if .John tells wlidlwr l\lary is asleep, thPn it follows that if Mary 
actually is asleep, he tells that she is asleep, and tlrnt if sh<' is not, he tells 
that she is not. 
It is remarkable that tl1is property of tdl ,;imply falls out the inde-
peu<leutly moti-.·ated assumption that it is an ,,xtensioual embedding verb. 
To tdl whetlwr Mnry is nsle<'p m<'ans to tell thf' true answer to the ques-
tion whether J\fary is asleep, which if Mary is asleep is t lw propo;;ition that 
J\fary is aslcl'JJ, aud if sh(' is not, is the proposition that shf' is not. 
Let 11s t.ak<• stock. ft seems that tlw phenomenon of qunntificational vari-
nbilit.y in interrogati\:f:S is a r<·al one. Ami on the fare of it, it St't'11ts to bl' in 
conflict. with exlrnustivencss. ITmn•ver, tlw J;,tt,•r is an indqwndent.ly moti-
vatnl featur<', awl iuis it up l,ns all kinds of 1lrawb11cks. \Vhat we want 
to show in tlic n·maiuckr of this papn is that, app<'araw·(•s (and Ilerman) 
not withstawling. quautifin,tioual rnriability can lH· .ic·(·ou11kd for 111 an 
itpproacl, wl,icl, con1plies with strong exlia11sti\·,.1wss. 
Tlw rnuai11d<'r of t hl' paper is orgauiz(·d a:< follows. Iu S<'cl ion 2, we 
sk<'tch how the- s<·nu,nti,· of ontli1wd al,ovc nrn !w 
impl,·11wnt.,•1I. I11 secti011 :! m· discuss th,· d,allc11g,· tlwt I3t·rman's proposals 
form for this In s,•ctirn, ,.j w,· show how this chall<'Il)2;<' cm1 be met, 
making ns,• of some- iw,iglits from dyuamic ,wm;intics. Th<' titrnl s,•ct.ion 5 
nmtains sonw condu, n·n,arks. 
2. A semantics for i11t.errogatives. 
lu tlw pn·vions sediou 1n· sketched iufonually tJi,. basics of ;1 s1·ll1,l!ltics 
for interro,,;;,tin·s within a d11ssirnl i11t1•11sio1rnl frnmc•work. This St'Ction 
indicates how .,;uch au arndysis c;lll lw iu1ple111entcd, awl iu\·,·sti)!;at.l'S tlw 
difforcnc,• lH'tW<'<'ll the· \,.,,,,); ,·xlia11st in•nc-ss \·i,·w all(! th,• st nmg "xh,rns-
ti'.'<·11<·:...s 1.~ic,v ·•· 
Startiuµ, J.l<1i11t i:, 1lw ;,,<,<11uptio11 t]i;,t it,;, worl,l :tll illt<'nop;ativc d,·-
1101,·s tlw pr"J!Ositiu11 rlwt is ,·S:]H<'Ssi·d by ito tr11,· ;,us,\',<·r in l}i;,t w,,rld. 
!-'or;, simpl1· s<'ri!,·1,r.i,,l i11l1·1Top,;itiY<' :,ud1 '" ( 1:311 .1, llii·, 11i<·;ius tli;,t iu c,,s,· 
:\!.try slc•1·ps. it d<'!lnt,·s 1111' propnsitioll t.li;it \.Ltry sl1·q1,s. aw\ iu cas<' slw 
do<'s Hot sl,·,·p. JI d('llld('s 11w prnpositillll that ;;Jw ,l<H's 111.11. ldn1t.ifyiilll, 
proposit.io11.s wit Ii sds of pw;sil,J,, worlds, t hi;; amom1ts to th,• followiug. ln 
il world u•. t }i,. ,wt of possil ,!,• worlds 1kuokd l,y ( l:!a) co11sist s of t.l1os,· 
1worlds U' such tlint '.II.try skcps iu 11• 1 iff slw sk('pl·i iu It'. L'.:;iu!'; two sort<'d 
typ,· tlwo1y as a !'<'J)l'l'S1'1Jli1li(l11 lm1.1•;,wis1·. (13,·) !'l'J>r<·:,i·Jtl:; tlw ,·xl<'11siou 
of ( l:Ja) i11 11·. B~ ;,J,,,tr:,dill.u o\'1'1 "'· \IT g<'t l:ld) a,, 11 n·1m•s1·utatiou of1: 
• Sc<' C:n1<·11,·11dijl, S: Stnklt"fi1~lS:2.J,lS-l,1\J,S\li fur lll<>n· d,·tnik 
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its meaning. Another assumption we have made implies that the whether-
complement (13b) that corresponds to the interrogative (13a) has the same 
extension and intension. 
(13) a. Does Mary sleep? 
b. whether Mary sleeps 
c. .\w'[S(w)(m) <-+ S(w')(m)] 
d . .\w.\w'[S(w)(m) <-> S(w')(m)] 
We noted above that interrogative embedding verbs exhibit a distinction 
that we find quite generally in functional expressions, viz., that between 
expressions which operate on the extension of their arguments, and those 
which take their intension. Examples of extensional verbs are know an<l tell, 
and wonder is an example of an intensional verb. This gives a straightfor-
ward account of the fact that (14a) and (14b) together entail (14c): 
(14) a. 	 John knows whether Mary sleeps. 
a'. I<(w)(j,.\w'[S(w)(rn) +-> S(w')(m)]) 
b. Mary sleeps.  
b'. S(w)(m)  
c. John knows that Mary sleeps.  
c'. I<(w)(j, .\w'[S(w')(m)j)  
Notice that this does not hinge on the factivity of the verb know. For as 
is shown in ( 15) the same entailment goes through for the non-factive verb 
tell: 
(15) a. 	 John tells whether Mary sleeps. 
a'. T(w)(j,.\w'[S(w)(m) <-> S(w')(ml]) 
b. Mary sleeps.  
b'. S(w)(m)  
c. John tells that Mary  
c' T(w)(j,.\w'[S(w')(m}])  
Given that wonder is an intensional verb, similar entailments do not occur 
with ( 16), wondering being a relation between individuals and questions, 
and not between individuals and propositions: 
(16) a. 	 John wonders whether Mary sleeps. 
a'. W(w)(j,,\w.\w'[S(w)(m) <-> S(w')(m)]) 
The meaning of a constituent interrogative, like the one in ( 17), is derived 
in a two-step proces. As we pointed out above, a constituent interrogative is 
associated with a relation. In the case of ( 17a) it is the property (one-place 
relation) of being a girl that sleeps, which is expressed by ( 17b). What the 
constituent interrogative asks for is a specification of the extension of the 
corresponding relation. The expression ( 17c) such a specification for 
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the property in ( 17b ), for in a world w it denotes the proposition that is 
true in a world w' iff the that sleep in w', are the same as the girls 
that sleep in w. This proposition an exhaustive specification of the 
extension of the property of being a sleeping girl in w. The expression 
(17d) represents tlie corresponding intension, Le., the question expresssed 
by (17a). 
(17) a. Which girl(s) sleep(s)? 
b. ..\x[G(w)(1·) I\ S(w)(x)] 
c. ..\w'V.r[[G(w)(x) /I 5(,c)(x)] <-> [G(w')(x) I\ S(w')(x)]] 
d. ..\w..\w'V.r[[G(w)(x) /I S(w)(x)] +-+ [G(w')(x) /I S(w')(x)]] 
This analysis repr<'scnts the strong exhaustin'ncss view on the meaning 
of constituent interrogatives. For an answer to (17a) should express the 
propositiou denoted by ( 17c ), nml hence it should not just say that a 1 ... an 
are girls tlrnt sleep. hut also tlrnt no other individual is. That is, an answer 
should specify that a 1 ••• a,. together form the entire positive extension of 
the property of being a girl that sleeps, not just that they are (among the) 
girls that sleep. An answer that contains only the latter information is 
weakly, but not strongly exhaustive. The weak exhaustiveness view can be 
represented in a similar fashion as the strong exhaustiveness approach: 
(18) a. Which girl(s) sleep(s)? 
b. ..\.r[G(w)(:r) I\ S(u•)(J·)J 
c . ..\u•'Vx[[G(,u)(.r) /I S(w)(.1·)]-> [G(1c 1 )(.r) /I S(w')(x)]] 
cl . ..\w..\w'V.i:[[G(w)(.r) /I 5(,c)(J·)]-> [G( ) /I S(w')(x)l] 
The derivntion of multiple constituent interrogatives follows the sam(' pat-
tern as that of single constituent interrogati,·es. Starting point is an ex-
pression R" which expresses an n-place relation. The denotation of the 
interrogative based on R" in a world w is the proposition which is true in 
those worlds tc' for which it holds that the exteusion of R" in w' is the 
same as that in w. Tims we arin· at tlw following general schema: 
..\w 1V.r1 ... :r11[R(t!')(.r1 . ...r 11 ) ,_. R(w
1 )(x1 .. ..rri)] 
Agaiu, this is the stnmg exhaustiveness \'iew. \Veakly exhaustive interpre-
tations result if we require not identity of extcnsi01L but only inclusion: 
Notice that it is only on th,• strong cxlinnsti,T11ess approach that sentential 
interrngatin·s fall ont of iu the general schema: t.hey result if n = 0. The 
W<"ak t'xhausti\·en<'SS analysis would need a separate interpretation rule for 
sentential interrngativcs. 
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Embedded constituent interrogatives are derived by the same process 
as embedded sentential intPrrogatives. Verbs like wonder operate 011 the 
intension of their argument, verbs like tell or know on its extension. This 
means that sentences like (Hla) and (20a) translate as (1%) and (20b) 
on the weak exhaustiveness approach, and that (10c) and (20c) an' the 
representation that the strong exhaustiveness view rise to: 
(19) a. John wonders which girl( s) sleep(s ). 
b. W(w)(j, ,\w,\w'V.r[[G(tt,)(:r) /\ S(w)(r)] _, [G(w')(.r) /\ S(w')(,r)Jl) 
c. vV(w)(j,,\w,\w'Vx[[G(w)(x) I\ S(w)(x)] <-> [G(w')(i·) /\ S(t1' 1 )(r)l]) 
(20) a. John tells which girl(s) sleep(s). 
b. T(w)(j, -Xw'V.r((G(w)(.r) /\ S(w)(.r)] _, [G(1.l")(.r) /\ S(w')(.r)J]) 
c. T(ic)(j, ,\w'V.r[{G(w)(.r) /\ S(w)(.r)] <-> [G(w')(i·) /\ S(w')(.r)]]) 
On both approach('s wonder cxpress('s a relation to the q11estion which 
girl(s) skep(s). and tdl a relation to thl' true answ('r to that question. 
Moreover, notict> that neither approacl1 neC'ds an additional fart.ivity pos-
tula t<' for tell. 
Let us look n little bit closer at what the two notions of <'Xhaustin·m·ss 
amount to in the rnse of (20). Under the assumption that tell is closed 
under entajJment, tlw weakly exhnustive interpretntion (20b) follows from 
th<' strongly exhaustive interprC'tation (20c). And if W<' assume that it 
is dosed under rnnjunctiou, then the wPakly exhausfrvp rending ( 20b) is 
equivaleut with (21 ), and hence, the latter is also entailed by th<' strong 
exhaustive rending ( 20c ): 
(21) V.r[[G(w)(.r) /\ S(w)(.r)] _, T(w)(j. All' 1 [G(11'1 )(.r) /\ !1' 1 )(.r)])] 
In the case of ( H)), which contains the intension11l wonder, a11 analogous 
paraphrase/entailment is not obtninablP. Tlw quantification m·n girls that 
sleep in w cannot be raised <Wcr the verb. because it is inside th<' scope of 
the intensionalizing AW. 
The expression in (21) represents the paraphrasp that Iknrnm would 
give for (20a). Dut Derman arrives at such a rPsult only hy 11wa11s of a 
factivity postulatP for tell with embC'dded interrogatives. where<1s no such 
assumption is lll'cessary 011 the approach outlined ahovP. 
Defore we turn to the strongly exhaustive iutcrpr<'tation, kt us be a 
little bit more cxplirit about tilt' transition from (20b) to [21). The two 
assumptions we made concerning the mcauing of tell, vii .. that if one tells 
p and p entails q, one also tells q, and that if one tells Jl and tells q. then on<' 
tells p and q, can he explicated in a Hintikka-stylc semantics for proposition 
embedding verbs. \Vithin that framework every such v<•rb F is associated 
with a predicate of possible worlds Vx.w· For example, with T for tell and 
j fur John, the extension of Tj,w is tlie set of worlds compatible with what 
John tells in w. Then it is laid down that John tells p in world IL' iff all 
worlds w' for whid1 Tj,w holds arf' worlds in wliicl1 pis true. This giv<'o us 
,cq11lvalc1H·cs ~ncli as: 
Gi\'t'Il that much. (20h) can be represented as (22), all(l (21) as (23): 
(22) Vw'[T1.11 ,(w 1 )--+ Vx[[G(w}(.r) A 5(1L·)(a,)] [C(w')(:r) A S(u-')(.r)])J 
(23\ V.r[[G(ir)(xJ !\ 5(11,J(.r)j Vu·'[TJ,ll.(ll•1 )-+ [G(,,.')(.r) /\ S(w')(.r)I]] 
Th'" equivalence of ( 22) and ), and hence of (20b) il.llcl ( 21 ). is a simple 
mat tn of predicate lugic. 
Turning to th,, ~trongly exlmnstin, reading of (20a), which was ,given 
as (20c) abovc, we notice tbat it can also be rrprcsentcd as (24): 
124) V1r 1 [T1 _.,.(11' 1 ) ~ V.r[[Giu·)(.r) !\ S(w)(.r)] "' [G(1r 1 )(.r) 1\ S1w 1 )(.rJ]l] 
Sine<" (24) can be ·dernmpospd' into tlw conjunction of (22), which rq,rc-
S<'nts the weakly exl1austi-ve reading. and (25 ): 
(25) Vw'[T1 ,,,.(w')--+ V.r[[G(w')(.r) A S(w')(.r)j--+ [G(,,·)(I) A S(11•J(I)J]] 
I he latter gin·s tlw addit.ional iufonuation which distinguishes I h1• strongly 
exli<1ustiv,· 1111,'rprl'tation fr<>tll tlH· weakly n:li;;11stin' orw. \Vhat this addi-
tiorn,l iufonnation amo1mts to. is pcrlwps mor<' perspicuously formulated 
in ; 2G )*, which is <'<J11i\·alent to (25 ): 
(26) V,r[3w'[Tj,u-(rc') /\ G(w')(.r) A 8(,L'')(x)] -t [G(ie)(n A S(w)(x)]J 
Tliis expresses that if it is corupatible with wliat Jol1u tells that someone 
is a girl who ikq,s. tlw11 tl1is pnsn11 nctually is a girl wlio s],,cps. For one 
• Hqiresentations wl1ich make use "ft he compatibility predicate induced 
by ~,roposition emlwclding \'erbs an- more perspicuous, at least for our 
present purposes. and we will use them in what. follows when appropri-
ate. But note that we can get our more familiar type of representation 
l,ack. if WP w,,ut (or w·,·d) to, For cxau1pk. (2G) is cquirnl<'lll with: 
('.~,) V.r[~V11"[1~,u\U'1)--+ -,[C:(11•1)(r) /1 S(u•')(.r)l] ~ [G(ll')(J) A S'(1r)(,·i]] 
whi<'h, using the Hintikka-styk defi1tition in the other din•ction, gi-vP~ us: 
(28) v.T[~T(w)(j, ,\ic',[G(w' )(.r) A S(;c')(I)]}-> [G(,c)(£) A S(w)(x)J] 
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thing, this means that if John tells of someone that she is a girl who sleeps, 
which implies that this is compatible with what he tells, then she actually 
is. (This gives us the £activity of tell when embedding an interrogative.) 
From the formulation (26) it is also obvious that the possibility that of 
some individuals John is not sure whether they are girls that are asleep is 
excluded on the strongly exhaustive reading. If it is compatible with what 
he tells that someone is a girl who sleeps, then, as (26) implies, she actually 
is. And from the weakly exhaustive part, expressed in (23), we know that 
if the latter is the case he tells that she sleeps. 
Having thus pinpointed the difference between the weakly and the 
strongly exhaustive reading, we finally note that we can put together the 
two conjuncts into which we decomposed (24), viz., (22) and (25), as follows: 
(27) 	\fx([[G(w)(x) I\ S(w)(x)] V :lw'[T1,.,,(w') I\ G(w')(x) I\ S(w')(:r)J] 
[G(w)(:r) /\ S(w)(x) I\ \fw'[Tj,w(w') [G(w')(:r) /\ S(w')(:r)]JJ] 
To see that this is equivalent to the original representation (20c), note that 
(23) is of the form \fx[<t> -> 1/>J, and (26) is of the form \fx[x 4>1, which 
combine to \fx[[ef> V x] -> [4> /\ ¢]], which is the form of (27). And (27) 
expresses that if an individual is actually a girl who sleeps or such that it 
is compatible with what John tells that she is a girl who sleeps, then she 
actually is a girl who sleeps and such that John tells that she is a girl who 
sleeps. 
It is the observation that (27) (also) represents the strongly exhaus, 
tive interpretation that forms the basis of our account of quantificational 
variability, which is presented in section 4. But first we turn to a closer 
examination of Berman's proposals. 
3. Berman's challenge. 
In the semantics sketched above, wh-terms do not translate as indepen-
dent quantificational expressions, but rather function as ( restricted) ).. 
abstraction. Yet it seems that, given the (weakly or strongly) exhaustive 
nature of questions, they in effect inherently amount to universal quantifi-
cation. Hence the phenomenon of quantificational val·iability seems to pose 
a serious problem for this semantics. The following examples, taken from 
Berman (1991), illustrate what is at stake: 
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(28) 	a. The principal usually finds out which students cheat on the 
final exam. 
b. 	Sue mostly remembers which of her birthday presents arrived 
special delivery. 
c. 	 \Vith few exceptions, Mary knows which students submitted 
which abstracts to which conferences. 
d. 	 Dill seldom acknowledges which colleagues he gets a good 
idea from. 
e. 	 John discovered which books were stolen from the library. 
These sentences have a reading in which the adverbs of quantification, 1l.m-
ally, mo.itly, with few exception.,, seldom, seem to have the effect of lending 
variable quantifieational force to the wh-terms in these sentences. Notice 
that the main verb in (28a), find out. is focfrve, but that in (28h), re-
member, is not. Sentence (28c) illustrates that quantificational variability 
can pertain to several wh-terms at the same time. And (28d) shows that 
it may affect both wh-terms and indefinite terms. Finally, (28e) is a case 
with a non-explicit adverb of quantification. Berman provides the following 
paraphrases: 
(29) 	a. For most students who cheat on the final exam, the principal 
finds out of them that they cheat on the final exam. 
b. 	 For most of her birthday presents that arrivc,d special delivery, 
Sue remembers that they arrived special delivery. 
c. 	 For most triples of R student, an abstract aud a conference 
such that the student submitted the abstract to the conference. 
1fary knows that tlie student snbmitt,~d the abstract to the 
confen'Hce. 
d. 	 For few pairs of a colleague and a good idea such that Bill gets 
the good idea from the colleague does he acknowledge he gets 
the good idea from the colleague, 
e. 	 For all books that were stolen from the library. .John  
dise<)\'ned that they \Yen· stolen from the library.  
If wh-phrases inhnently lmn• universal qua1Jtificational force, how can we 
explain the quantificational rnriability exemplified by tlwse sentences? Ex-
haustiveness, e\·en weak exlrnusth·<·1wss. seems to be at odds with examples 
like (28a)-(28<l). Berman describes the situation in the following way. He 
notes that although sentence (30) is rnntradictory, (31) is not: 
(30) 	John knows who is rnnuing, but he doesn't know that George 
is running. 
(31) 	John mostly knows who ic< rnnniHg. hut hf' doesn't know that 
Georg<> i:; nmnillg. 
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Likewise, he observes that although (32c) follows from (32a,h ), no such 
entailment holds between ( 33c) and ( 33a, b): 
(32) a. John knows who is running. 
b. George is running. 
c. John knows that George is running. 
(33) a . .Johu mostly knows who is running. 
b. George is runnh1g. 
c. .John knows that George is running. 
These observations, Berman concludes, show that exhaustiveness is not an 
inher<:nt property of interrogatin,s, and that hence an alternative account 
of the semantics of (•mhcddcd constituent intcrrogativ1•s is nt'eded. 
WC' will now sketch what we takf' to he the rnre of B1•rman's analy-· 
sis. Starting poi11t is that w/q,bra.s<·s should not lw trc,nt.<,d ,,s inhr,rcntly 
quantificational hut rathn in the way indefinit1,s are treated 
in Lewis/K,nnp/Ifrim-styk disrnnrse representation theory.• This means 
that, like ind<·fiuites, ·wh-tnms nrc associated with da11s, s i'Xprcssing con-0 
ditions on fn·P variab!Ps. Coustitu('nt interrogatives correspond to opc11 
formulae. So pa.ralld to example (17) in the previous section, th(' logical 
form assigned to ( 34a) is ( :J4b ): 
(:H) a. which p;irl(s) sb·p(s) 
h. G(;i:) A S( i: j 
A c.rncial feature of Uenm.1n's analysis is that the embedding Vt'rbs which 
we have d11blied 'cxteusioual', ,uch as know and td/, opcraw 011 these open 
s<cnknccs directly. As is to b,· expected, the bindinp; of the free variables 
is tak,·n eare of by implicit or •·xplicit. ai.lverbs of quant.ifi,'.ation. Via a. 
process of presupposition ,HTmmnodatiou tbe opPn st>11teuce which is the 
arp;nrn<·nt of the emheddinp; verb is 'raised' to act ns the rl'strictiou of the 
quantifier corr<'Spolldillp; t,, t.lt,, ;u!verl,. \Vbat W<' 11,1\'f' i:all,•d 'intensional' 
verl,s, such a, ·wonder·. lwlrnv,• differently. howe\'1•r. Such 1·erl1:, do not 
tnk,· open S<'Jllcnc,~s m, sndt ,,s tlwir arp;nmcut. lmt tlw 1pu•stio11s thnt can 
lw forrnc,d frorn tlt<.'lll. Ill t lies.· eases tltc fr,•1\ vnrialil1•s iu tlw cml,eddcd 
intcrrogativ1• p;d l,oull(I as a result of this proc<'s>i of question formation. 
I3dorc turniug to Berman's ac,omn of emh1•dd1,d co11st.it.rn·ut. inter 
rogativcs, w,· first ta.kl' a look at his rule of <pwst.io11 forrnatio11. Questions 
rl'sult 1,y prdixiuµ; a so call,·d (J-lllorplwuw to mt Oj><'ll s1•nt,•11c,· rontain-
in!!, one of mmT nrrurr,:•nr,•s of wh term,. The s,•urnntic inkrpn·t ation of 
* Sec Lewis ( l '.)7:', I, IS:arnp I l'.):Sli, Heim 1. rnS:>,). 
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the Q-morpheme results in a Hamblin-type interpretation of constituent 
interrogatives.* It is given in ( 3:i ):*• 
(35) 	[Q¢,]A1.g 
The existential quantifiers in this definition bind the free variables intro-
duced by the wh-terms in the open formula ¢ that ,orresponds to the 
wnstituent interrogative. \Ve see that the semantic result of application of 
the Q-morpheme to the open sentence is a set of propositions that each rep-
resent a possible partial answer. So the interrogative (36a) is represented 
as ( 3Gb ), which in terms of the represeutation language used in this paper 
amounts to (3Gc): 
(3G) 	a. Which girl(s) sleep(s}"? 
b. Q[G(1·) /\ S(.r)]  
c ,\p3r[p ,\11,[G(11')(.r) /\ S(w)(.r)J]  
Let us now look at I3cnmm·s analysis of embedded constituent interroga-
tin,s. \Ve start with the 'intensional' case. As was indicated above, 'inten-
sional' verbs tak<' as their argum!'nt the question expressed by the embedded 
interrogatin·. H<'lH'e a sn1tcnce such as (3'ia) is assigned the logical form 
{3Tb ): 
(37) 	a. John wonders which girl(,) ;;leep(s). 
b. lV(.i.Q[G(.r)/\8(.rJ]) 
If we compare this analysis with the one in the previous section we 
notice that in both the argument of the \Trb is a question, which in its 
turn determines answerhood. How<·Ye1-, the analyses differ substantially in 
* Sec Hambliu ( 1 !)73 ). 
•• Notice that the interpretation scheme for the Q-morpheme does not 
give proper results in case \\'(' are dealing with a sPntential interrogative. 
Sine(' in that case th,· scntCIH'(' docs not contain wh-terms. no existential 
qnantifiatiou \\·cmld lw iunih-ed. The n·sult mmld be [Q,;:,l11 · = {p J p =9 
[o]"l.9 }. This gin·s us the proposition expressed o. i.e., only the 
·positive· answer. I3ut that is not the only possible answer. Hence, in case 
of St'!ltential iutcrrogatin"s. \\T shonld rather interpret the Q-morpheme as 
follows: [Qo]\l.g = {p I p = \f.g V p = [,efi]M,9}. In fact, this flaw 
in I3('rman's analy;;is is directly related to the matter of exhausti\·eness. 
For recall that the gcncnil sd1<.'IIH' for interrogative formation that was 
stated in th<' pr('vious section. which starts from au n-placc relation, with 
sentential int<.'rrogatin's in the rnse of 11 0, and which lets the question 
be the equirnlencc relation on possibk worlds of having the same (positin') 
extension. results i11 strongly exhm1stin' r<'adiugs. 
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their view on the nature of answers, and hence questious. The analysis 
of section 2 associates an interrogative in a world with one complete true 
aJ1swer. In Berman's analysis an interrogative is linked to the same set of 
all possible partial answers in every world. From this set we can extract 
the true partial answers in a world, by selecting the propositions which are 
true in that world. That, in effect, would amount to l'\arttunen 's analysis.* 
If we take the intersection of the resulting set of propositions, we eud up 
with the weakly exhaustive analysis outlined in the previous section. And 
if we add a clause stating that no other individuals satisfy th(' relation on 
which the interrogat.iv<' is ha~ed, the strongly exhaustive analysis results. 
It is worth noticing that Berman could have chosen any of these altPniative 
interpretations of the Q-morpheme. The only thing that is essPntial for his 
approach is that the Q-morpheme takes n,re ofthr binding of the variables 
introduced by the wh-terms in the embedded interrogative. Of conrse, the 
choice between these alternatives, Hamblin-type, Karttunen-type, weakly 
exhaustive, strongly exhaustive, is not a matter of taste but lrns to be nmde 
on empirical an<l methodological grounds, as we have argued extensively 
elsewhere. 
Now we come to Berman's account of the 'extensional' cases. As we 
said above, Berrnan assumes that these vcrhs opPratc on the op<'n formulae 
a.,;;sociated with the constituent interrogatives, and not on the questions 
that can be formed from them. A further assumption which he makes, in 
line with the standard approach to adverbs of quantification,•• is that the 
logical form of sentences such as (38a) and (39a) is a tripartite structure. 
The three constituents of this structure are: an adverb of quantification (if 
no adverb occurs, universal quantification is the default); the restriction of 
the quantification; and the nuclear scope of the quantification. Consider 
the following simple examples, one with and one without an explicit adverb 
of quantification: 
(38) a. John usually knows which girl(s) sleep(s). 
b. MOSTx[G(x) I\ S(x)J[/1..(j,girl(x) I\ S(x))] 
(39) a. John tells which girl(s) skcp(s). 
b. ALLx[G(x) I\ S(x)J[T(j,girl(x) I\ S(x))] 
The logical forms (38b) and (39b) illustrate the general pat.tern. Thi; nu-
clear scope consists of the embedding verb and its two arguments: the 
subject and the open formula corresponding to the constituent interroga-
tive. The restriction is formed by the same open formula. It gets there 
• See Karttunen ( 1977).  
•• See Lewis (1975).  
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via the process of presupposition accommodation. In case of verbs such as 
know, this process operates with the presupposition standardly associated 
with £active verbs. In case of non-factive verbs such as tell, the assumption 
has to be made that such verbs are factive when embedding an interrog-
ative, despite the fact that they are not factive in general. The adverb 
quantifies non-selectively over the free variables in its arguments, and thus 
takes care of the binding. 
In Berman's analysis the difference between the 'intensional' and the 
'extensional' cases is taken to reside in different structural properties of 
the sentences in question. It is assumed that a sentence such as (37a), in 
which the intensional verb wonder occurs, does not give rise to a tripartite 
structure b{'cause wonder i,; not factive and because it operates on ques-
tions rather than open formulae. In the resulting logical form there are no 
free variables left for an adverb of quantification to bind, since they are 
bound already by the Q-morpheme. Hence such sentences do not exhibit 
quantificational variability. 
Let us uow turn to an evaluation of Berman's proposal. The rn.ain 
thing to note is that at essential points his analysis of embedded and non-
embedded interrogatives is not in accordance with some of the general as-
sumptions outlined in the introductory section. The 'stand alone' and em-
bedded occurrences of interrogatives are not treated uniformly throughout. 
Remarkable is the radical difference between the kind of semantic object 
associated with an interrogative embedded by a verb like wonder and that 
expressed by an interrogath·e that is the argument of verbs such as know 
and tell. The latter verbs operate on open formulae, not on questions, as 
the former do. Also note that these open formulae as such cannot be associ-
ated with answers to the corresponding questions. A reasonable semantics 
for sentences of this type results not simply aftpr combining the verb with 
its argument. but only after the subsequent procedure of accommodating 
the embedded interrogatiw as a presupposition in the restriction of an (im-
plicit or explicit) adverb of quantification. Also, this procedure requires an 
assumption of factivity for such verbs as tell which ascribes them the prop-
erty of presupposing their argument just in cases this is an interrogative. 
This makes a lexical semantic property dependent on a structural syntactic 
one, which is unusual, to say the least. Finally, ohscrve that this difference 
in type of semantic objects prohibits a uniform account of coordination and 
entailment. 
It seems to us that an analysis that does accord with the general 
assumptions made in the introdn,tnry section. aud which is able to explain 
the differences in possible qna11tifi,a tional variability in terms of a general 
mechanism, is to he preferred. Therefore, we will outline in the next section 
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how the semantics of interrogatives described above <"an be made to lrnrnllc 
the plwnornenou of quantificational variabilit.y. 
4. Berman's challenge met. 
\Ve will show how the analysis of section 2 can l)(' mad<' to rn,•d Ikrrn.in 's 
challenge stf•pwisP. \Ve start by sl10wiug how quantifirntioual v<1rial,ility 
can be had on the weak exhaustiveness view, siuce the latter is Hl'arest to 
Berman's own analysis. Then we will strengthen the result to comply with 
strong cxham,tivencss. 
Recall from section 2 that in a weakly <'xhaustive analysis, a. s<'ut.enc<' 
like (40a.) is translated as (40b). The latter is equivalent to {40,), which we 
,ould abo write in 'advnbs of quautificatiou'-~tyh" ns (40d): 
(40) a. ,John tdls which girl(s) sleep(s). 
b. T(w)(j, .,\w'\f:r[[G(w)(.r) A S(w)(,r)]-> [G(u,')(:r) A S(w')(.r)]J) 
c. \f.r[[G(w)(.r) A S(u•)(:r)J-> T(w)(j,.,\ip'[G(w')(:r) A S(11•1 )(.r)])J 
<l. ALL.,.[G(1P)(.r) A S(1r){.r)J[T(11•)(j, .-\w'[G(H•')(.r) A S(rp')(.r)])] 
The last representation is virtually the same as what. results in Il<·nnan's 
analysis, hut notice that it is ohtai1wd wit!wut ha\·iug t.o a;;s1111H· tlrnt. lrll 
is factive, and without presupposit.inu affomodatiou, dnc to th<' fad that 
t.he embC'dded int.errogat.iv<' is a;;sigtH'd a meaning of its owu. 
Out, as w,, ;;aw in the previous s<'ct.ion, the r<'a.son for Dernrnu to 
deviate from this straightforward analysis are scnteuc(•s c·ont.a.iuiug explicit. 
adverbs of quantification, such as (41a). As wP n·mark<·d earlirr it. sc•ems 
an inlwwnt frat me of hotl1 t.hr weakly and th<' stroui;ly exhaustive analysis 
that wh-t.<TJ11s hav<' uuiw·rsnl <111autifin,tional fol'<'c. S,, the prohl<•m is how 
we can get rid of the 1nfrvcrsal qunnt.ifkier AU,,. aud 'replace' it by the 
quantifier MOST, iu ord<'r lo oht,,in (41 b ). which rqm•sents tlw lll(';mi11g 
Derman a;;signs to (41 al: 
(41) a. John usually t<'lls which girl(s) sleep(s). 
b. MOSTx[G(w)(.r) A S(w)(,r)J[T(w)(j,,\w'[G(w')(.r) A S(w')(.r)])j 
This is W<'rl' dynamic semaHti,s e011ws in. 
In dynamk semantics* inddinit.es me not. analyzl'd as introducing free 
variabks, as in disconrsl' wpresent.ation tlwory, but as quantifirntio1rnl <'X·· 
pressions i11 their own right. A simple douk!'y sc11t.Plll'(' like ( 42a) is tmus 
lated as ( 42b ). The dynamic iutcrpret.atiou assigw·d to the cxisln1t.ial quan-
tifier makes (42h) equivalent to tlH' ordinmy trnuslat.iou ( 42,) in st.;mdanl 
pn•dicatP loµ;ic: 
• Sn• Groen<'!Hlijk & St.okhof ( 1090,l!JDl ). 
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(42) a. If John owns a donkey he beats it 
b. :lx[D(;1:) I\ H(j,x)] _, B(j,x) 
c. Vx[[D(x) I\ H(j,x)] _, B(j,x)] 
The interpretation of the existential quantifier in dynamic semantics ensures 
that the existentially quantified antecedent of (42b) outputs assignments 
in which the value of the variable x is a donkey that John owns. The 
interpretation of the implication as a whole is defined in such a way that it 
takes all such output assignments, and checks whether the values of x satisfy 
the consequent, i.e., whether they are indeed beaten by John. If so, the 
implication is considered true. So the truth conditions of (42b) in dynamic 
semantics arc the same as the truth conditions of ( 42c) in ordinary static 
semantics. The relevant fact that we make use of here is that in dynamic 
semantics the following equivalence holds without the usual restriction that 
:r does not occur freely in the consequent: 
Observe that, given this fact, in dynamic semantics ( 40c) is equivalent to 
(43): 
(43) :lx[G(w)(x) /\ S(w)(:r)] _, T(w)(j, Aw'[G(w')(x) I\ S(w')(x)]) 
vVhat we need to know next is how adverbs of quantification can be dealt 
with in a dynamic framework. Following the proposals of Dekker and Chier-
chia this can be clone as follows.* As we noted above, a formula of the form 
:lx,;i, outputs all those assignments that assign values to ;r that satisfy ¢,. 
This makes the variable 2: m·ailable for further quantification. And because 
of that, the adverb of c1mmtification in AQx[:lx,;i,J[v,J rnn quantify over the 
output of :l:r,;i,, and require that a Q-amount of such outputs satisfy the con-
dition V'· In other words, given the dynamic interpretation of the existential 
quantifier we obtain equiva.lences of the following form: 
where Q is the ordinary quantifier corresponding to the adverb of quan-
tification .4Q, even though the ,·ariable 2· is existentially quantified in the 
antecedent. 
* See Dekker (1!)!)2 ), Chierchia (1!)!)2 ). What is said in the text makes 
use of only a small part of their analyses. For example, we completely 
disregard the issue of symmetric versus non-symmetric readings, whi,h both 
Dekker and Chierchia discuss extensively. 
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For the purposes of the present paper, this much suffices, and we must 
refer to reader to the papers by Dekker and Chierchia for a substantiation 
of this claim and more details. 
Given these two facts of dynamic semantics, we may rest assured that 
when an implicational structure of the form ( 44a) is combined with an 
adverb of quantification, it can be represented as in ( 44b ), which in the 




Once we know this much, sentences with adverbs of quantification no longer 
present a problem. Consider again example (41a), repeated below as (45a). 
We know that we can represent its meaning without the adverb of quantifi-
cation in the form of the implicational structure ( 45b ), which is equivalent 
with ( 45c). The result of combining it with the adverb of quantification 
can be represented as in (45d), which is equivalent with (45e): 
(45) a. John usually tells which girl(s) sleep(s). 
b. 	 \lx[[G(w)(x) I\ S(w)(x)]-> T(w)(j, ,\w'[G(w')(x) I\ S(w')(x)])] 
c. 	 :lx[G(w)(x) I\ S(w)(x)]-> T(w)(j, ,\w'[G(w')(x) I\ S(w')(x)]) 
d. 	 USUALLY[:lx[G(w)(x) I\ S(w)(x)]][T(w)(j, ,\w'[G(w')(x) I\ S(w')(x)])J 
e. 	 MOST,[G(w)(x) I\ S(w)(x)J[T(w)(j, ,\w'[G(w')(x) I\ S(w')(x)])] 
In this way we can obtain the meanings Berman wants to assign to sentences 
like ( 45a), but in a more straightforward and simple way. vVe make use of 
extensionality of the verb tell without having to assume it to be factive 
when embedding an interrogative. Interrogatives are assigned an indepen-
dent and uniform (weakly) exhaustive interpretation. And the quantifica-
tional variability induced by the occurrence of adverbs of quantification is 
obtained by making use of equivalences which rest on independently moti-
vated clauses in dynamic semantics. 
This shows how Berman's readings of sentences with adverbs of quan-
tification can be obtained by combining the weakly exhaustive interpreta-
tion of interrogatives from section 2 with a dynamic semantic approach to 
quantification. However, we argued earlier that the weakly exhaustive in-
terpretation is not the right one, and that strong exhaustiveness is needed. 
Let us repeat what is at stake here. Consider (46a,b,c ): 
(46) a. John knows which girl(s) sleep(s). 
b. 	 Of every girl who sleeps, John knows that she is a girl who sleeps. 
c. 	 Of no girl who doesn't sleep, John believes that she is a girl who 
sleeps. 
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In section l we argued that (46a) entails both (4Gb) and (46c). However, a 
weakly exhaustive interpretation only accounts for the entailment between 
(46a) and (46b ), but it does not give us the other one. The latter entail-
ment is what strong exhaustiveness adds to weak exhaustiveness: If it is 
compatible with what John knows that an individual is a girl who sleeps, 
then she actually is.* 
Similar observatio11s can be mad,· with n'spect to scntcnee (4 7a ), whid1 
differs from (46a) only in that it contains the adverb of quantification usu-
ally. Again, the a-sentence should entail both the b- and the c-sentence, 
but the weakly exhau:;tive reading accounts only for the fin,t entailment: 
(47) a . .John usually knows which girl(s) sleep(s). 
b. 	 Of most girls who sleep, John knows that they are girls who sleep. 
c 	 Of few girls w!to don't sleep, John beli<)ves that they are girls wlio 
sleep. 
Establishing the truth conditions of sentences such as ( 4 7a) is a complicated 
matter. In order to decide whct.ht•r (47aj is tr11e or uot, WE' need access to 
two sets of individuals: the set of individuals that actually are girls who 
sleep; and the set of individuals of whom it is compatible with John's infor-
mation that thf'y arc p;irls who sleep. In order to sec what the actual truth 
conditions are, observe that the latter set may contain not only individ-
uals that actually are girls that sleep, but also individuals of whom John 
wrongly believes that they are. and individuals of whom he is in doubt as 
to whether they arc girls wlto sleep or not. Notice further that individuals 
that actually are p;irls who sleep may be lacking from it. So from the two 
sets we start out with we can construct four other sets: the set of individ-
uals John has a defiuit<' aud correct 01mion about.; t.hf' set containing t.hc 
individuals about whom he has a wrong opinion; the set consisting of the 
ones he is in doubt about; and the set containing the ones he misses. The 
truth rnnditions of ( 47a) ran 1Jl' stalf'd in terms of a comparison between 
the union of the last three sets with the first one: the cardinality of the 
first should be (considerably) less than that of the second. 
Now we turn to qnantificational '.:ariability and strong exhaustiveness. 
Repeated below as ( 48) is the representation of the strongly exhaustive 
analysis sentence (46a) which we gave at the end of section 2: 
(48) Vx[([G(1r)(J:) /\ S(w)(.r)] 	V :lw'[Tj," (w') I\ G(w')(:r) I\ 5(w')(x)]J _, 
[G(w)(.r) 11 S(w)(.r) I\ Vw'[T1_,,,(w') _, [G(w')(:r) /I S(w1 )(1·)]]]] 
* Another relevant observation is that weak exhaustiv<'ness predicts that 
Noone is running entails E-ucryone kno·wg who is running, and that John 
tells that everyone is T"lmning entails John tells who is running. In our 
opinion this is not <1uit.e what. one would like to have. 
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Within the framework of dynamic semantics this is equivalent to (49): 
(49) 	3x[[G(w)(x) I\ S(w)(x)] V 3w'[Tj,w(w') I\ G(w')(x) I\ S(w')(x)Jl _. 
[G(w)(x) I\ S(w)(x) I\ Vw'[Tj,w(w')-+ [G(w')(x) I\ S(w')(x)l]J 
And this represents the required strongly exhaustive interpretation. Notice 
that we obtain this result without recourse to the assumption that sentences 
like this contain an implicit adverb of quantification. 
Also, we know that given the dynamic treatment of adverbs of quan-
tification 
( 47a) can be represented as (50): 
(50) 	USUALLY[3x[[G(w)(x) /\ S(w)(x)] V 3w'[Tj,w(w1 ) I\ G(w')(x) I\ S(w')(x)]]] 
[G(w)(x) I\ S(w)(x) I\ Vw'[Tj,w(w')-+ [G(w')(x) I\ S(w')(x)ll] 
And (50), we know, is equivalent with (51): 
(51) 	MOSTx[[G(w)(x) /\ S(w)(x)] V 3w'[Tj,w(w') I\ G(w')(x) I\ S(w')(x);] 
[G(w)(x) I\ S(w)(x) I\ Vw'[Tj,w(w')-+ [G(w')(x) I\ S(w')(x)]]J 
This gives the right quantificational results. According to the restriction 
clause the quantification is over individuals that are either girls that actually 
sleep or individuals of whom it is compatible with what John tells that 
they are girls who sleep ( or both). The quantifier requires that most of 
them should be girls who sleep and that John should tell that they are. It 
is easy to see that this strongly exhaustive interpretation entails Berman's 
weakly exhaustive reading. For if we simply drop the second disjunct in the 
restriction clause in (51) the number of individuals quantified over becomes 
potentially less. If John is correct about most individuals in the larger set, 
then he is certainly also right about most individuals in potentially smaller 
set. 
The quantifiers ALL and ~WST that correspond to the adverbs always 
and usually have in common that they are upward monotonic. Let us con-
clude this section with an investigation of two downward monotonic cases. 
If we replace MOST in (51) by FEW, we may observe that because of the 
downward monotonicity of FEW, Berman's weakly exhaustive interpreta-
tion now entails the strongly exhaustive one, rather than the other way 
around, as in the case of AU and MOST. To see that this is so, suppose 
that of about 50 percent of the girls that are asleep, John tells that they 
are, then according to Berman's analysis it is false that John seldomly tells 
which girl(s) sleep(s), even if at the same time John tells of a large amount 
of individuals that are not girls that sleep, that they are. This is clearly 
not correct. The strongly exhaustive analysis correctly predicts that in this 
case it is true that John rarely tells which girl(s) sleep(s). If we look at 
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the individuals that actually sleep and at those that actually do not but of 
whom John tells that they do, then he is correct only in few cases. 
·with NO things are slightly different. In that case the two approaches 
give equivalent results. This can be seen as follows. The second disjunct 
in the restriction clause potentially adds cases that have to be taken into 
consideration. But if it really adds an individual, this should not be a 
girl that actually sleeps, i.e., this should not be an individual that already 
satisfies the first disjunct of the restriction clause. But such individuals 
cannot satisfy the nuclear scope clause, since they will not satisfy the first 
conjunct of it. These results seem to be in accordance with the facts. 
The discussion of these examples shows that quantificational variabil-
ity and strong exhausti\'cncss, contrary to appearance and Berman, are 
not incompatible. Recasting the analysis of section 2 in the framework of 
a dynamic semantics allows us to retain the original strongly exhausti\'e 
interpretation of interrogati\·es, which is in accordance with the general as-
sumptions laid down in section 1, and to account for the phenomenon of 
quantificational variability in embedded interrogatives. 
5 .final remarks. 
First of all, we want to draw attention to what seems to be a rather funda-
mental difference between the approach presented in the previous section, 
and Berman's way of dealing with quantificational variability. The two ap-
proaches resemble each other in that both associate sentences containing 
adverbs of quantification with tripartite structures in which an adverb of 
quantification takes a restriction clause and a nuclear scope clause as ar-
guments. But the approaches differ not only in what they consider to be 
the contents of the arguments of the adverb, but also in how they arrive 
at them. In Berman's case the restriction clause is formed by accormno-
dating a facti\-e presupposition. The analysis presented in the previous 
section deri\·es the contents of both arguments of the adverb by 'decom-
posing' the meaning of the sentence without the adverb into two parts, 
that can be viewed as the antecedent and the consequent of an implica-
tional structure. In Berman's case the relevant presupposition is identical 
to the propositional argument of the main verb, and hence extractable from 
surface syntactic structure. In our analysis the restriction clause and the 
nuclear scope clause cannot be determined at this level. For the surface 
form of these sentences is not that of an implication. However, we have 
shown that their semantic representations can be cast in this format within 
a dynamic framework. So, this analysis seems bound to the view that it is 
only on the basis of the semantic content of an entire sentence that we can 
detffmine what constitutes the restriction and the nuclear scope of an ad-
verb of quantification occurring in it, and that its syntactic structure does 
not suflke. \Ve are not sure what conclusions can be drawn from this, but 
we note that this aspect of our analysis seems to be in line with Roberts' 
argument that domain restriction in general is not simply a matter of what 
she calls a 'structure driven algorithm', but largely depends on different 
kinds of contextual (semantic am! pragmatic) factors.• 
Another remark we want to make is that in the analysis proposed in the 
previous section, a crucial feature of Berman's analysis, viz., that wh-terms 
ru-e to be treated in th<' same way as indefinitf·s, playes no rol<·. Treating 
them like indefinites in a dynamic framework would mean translating them 
in terms of dynamic existential quantification. But this we did not do. 
(\Ve did mak<' use of dynamfr existential quantification, hut not in the 
trnnslation of wh-terms as such, but only in order to arrive at the required 
irnplicational structure.) Still, it might be interesting to point out that we 
might do so if for whatever reason this seems to be desirable after all. ·we 
have seen that if existential quantification is dynamic, W<' can 'disclose' the 
property >.xcf, from the existentially quantified formula This means 
that in the end it makes no difference whether we deal with wh-terms as a 
form of n'strict<'d ,\-1.1bstraction, or as dynamic exist<>nt.i.il quantification. 
A perhaps more interesting observation is that in some cases indefinites 
behave like wh-terms. It seems that a sentence like (52a) has a reading 
(mflyhe it is Pven its mo~t likely one) in which it is <·quivalmt with (52h): 
(52) a. 	 John (usually) knows whether a girl sleeps. 
b. John (usually) knows which girl( s) sleep( s ). 
On a dynamic account of iudefiuites, this reading <:>asily falls out. 
In fact, even universally quantified terms sometimes lend themselves 
to quantificational variability, viz., in sentences with so-called pair-list read-
ings. Sentenn' (53a) lias a reading on which it is equivalent with {53h). 
(53) 	a . .Jolm {usually) knows which professor recommended every/each 
student. 
b. John {usually) knows which professor recommended which student. 
Elsewhere.. we have given an analysis of a sentence like (53a) which makes 
it equivalent to ( 53b ). That being so, such sentences lend themselves equally 
easily to quantificational variability. 
The following sentence is a variant of Berman's sentence (28c ), cited in 
section 3. It contains a wh-term, an indefinite and a universally quantified 
• See Roberts (1991).  
** See Groenendi.jk & Stokhof ( 1984, chapter 6).  
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term, and illustrates that all three of them can be subject to binding by 
the same adverb of quantification: 
(54) 'With few exceptions, 	Mary knows which abstract every student 
submitted to a conference. 
The conslusion we draw from these observations is that although it may 
be appealing at first sight to treat wh-terms in the same way as indefinites 
in order to account for quantificational variability, in fact this hypothe-
sis seems unwarranted. As the example (54) indicates, we can treat them 
either as restricted A-abstraction, or in terms of dynamic existential quan-
tification, or in terms of universal quantification. It does not really matter. 
As long as we assign interrogatives a strongly exhaustive interpretation, 
quantificational variability can be accounted for in any of these three alter-
natives. 
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